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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






K. KABASHA GRIFFIN-EL, 




JEFFREY BEARD; DONALD VAUGHN; JOHN S. SHAFFER; 
DAVID DIGUGLIELMO; MICHAEL A. LORENZO; WILLIAM FAIRALL; 
THOMAS DOHMAN; JOHN W. MOYER; WENDY SHAYLOR; 
JASON DOMBROSKY; EARL E. THOMAS a/k/a E.E. THOMAS; 
RONALD QUICK; THOMAS SCARPATI; SYLVIA PALLOTT; JAIME LUQUIS; 
GERALD SOBOTOR; MARY CANINO; KIM ULISNY; FRANCIS FEILD; 
GERALD GALINSKI; WILLIAM BANTA; GUY SMITH; ROBERT BITNER 
 
William Banta, Robert Bitner, Mary Canino, 
David DiGugliemo, Thomas Dohman, Jason Dombrosky, 
Francis Feild, Gerald Galinski, Michael A. Lorenzo, 
John W. Moyer, Sylvia Pallott, Ronald Quick, 




Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-06-cv-02719) 
Magistrate Judge: Honorable L. Felipe Restrepo 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 12, 2011 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, BARRY and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 









VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 K. Kabasha Griffin-El, a state inmate, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 against numerous officials and employees of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections (“DOC”), alleging the violation of his constitutional rights arising from the 
search of his cell and confiscation of his property that followed the enactment of a DOC 
policy prohibiting inmate possession of certain UCC-related materials.  The District 
Court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims except a First 
Amendment claim against sixteen defendants (hereinafter “Appellants”) that alleged that 
they had retaliated against Griffin-El for making complaints and filing grievances relating 
to the search and seizure.  Appellants filed this interlocutory appeal, challenging the 
District Court’s denial of qualified immunity on the retaliation claim.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will vacate the order of the District Court insofar as it denied Appellants 
qualified immunity, and remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings 
consistent with our opinion. 
I. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction in this case under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 
1343(a)(3).  We have jurisdiction to review a district court’s “denial of a claim of 
qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law,” as a final decision 
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).  
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“We have no jurisdiction, however, in an interlocutory appeal to review a District Court’s 
determination that there is sufficient record evidence to support a set of facts under which 
there would be no immunity.”  Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F.3d 409, 415 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (citing Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995)).  Therefore, “our 
jurisdiction to review the District Court’s order denying summary judgment depends on 
whether the defendants’ appeal raises pure questions of law or whether it challenges the 
District Court’s determination of which facts were sufficiently supported by evidence.”  
Blaylock v. City of Philadelphia, 504 F.3d 405, 409 (3d Cir. 2007).  “If we have 
jurisdiction to review an order rejecting qualified immunity at the summary judgment 
stage, our review of the order is plenary.”  Eddy v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Auth., 
256 F.3d 204, 208 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 Appellants argue that the District Court’s analysis of the qualified immunity issue 
was deficient in two primary respects.  First, relying on Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 
F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 1996), and Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1999), Appellants 
argue that the District Court failed to analyze the specific conduct of each Appellant 
claiming qualified immunity.  Second, relying on Forbes v. Township of Lower Merion, 
313 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002), they argue that the District Court failed “to specify those 
material facts that are and are not subject to genuine dispute and explain their 
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materiality.”  Id. at 146.  Because we find these arguments raise pure questions of law, 
we conclude that we possess jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal.1
II. 
 
 “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability 
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”  Pearson v. 
Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 
(1982)).  Thus, two separate inquiries govern whether an official is entitled to qualified 
immunity:  (1) whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff establish a violation of a 
constitutional right, and (2) whether the constitutional right at issue was clearly 
established at the time of the alleged violation.  Id. at 815-16 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 
U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818 (holding that courts 
may address either of these issues first)).  “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in 
determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a 
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”  Saucier, 
                                              
1 Griffin-El contends that Appellants challenge the District Court’s findings as to 
the sufficiency of the evidence to create genuine issues of material fact and that we 
therefore lack jurisdiction.  We disagree.  Appellants’ arguments in no way require our 
review of the District Court’s determination that the pretrial record contained sufficient 
evidence to raise genuine issues of fact for trial. 
Griffin-El also argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction because the District Court 
determined that the availability of qualified immunity depended on material issues of fact 
that would have to be determined by a jury.  The mere fact, however, that the District 
Court determined that there are disputed factual issues relating to qualified immunity 
does not deprive us of jurisdiction to review the purely legal questions Appellants raise.  
See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312-13 (1996); Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 
1247 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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533 U.S. at 202.  “[I]t is not sufficient that the right at issue be clearly established as a 
general matter.  Rather, the question is whether a reasonable public official would know 
that his or her specific conduct violated clearly established rights.” Grant, 98 F.3d at 121 
(citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 636-37 (1987)). 
 Consistent with the instruction that qualified immunity be assessed in the context 
of each individual defendant’s specific conduct, we have required “an analysis of the 
facts adduced concerning the conduct of the official who claims immunity.”  Brown v. 
Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1111 (3d Cir. 1990).  Thus, where, as here, a claim is asserted 
against numerous officials who interacted with the plaintiff in different ways and at 
different times, we have directed that the district court “analyze separately the conduct of 
each . . . Defendant against the constitutional right allegedly violated.”  Grant, 98 F.3d at 
123; see also Rouse, 182 F.3d at 200-01.  Furthermore, to facilitate our review of 
qualified immunity decisions, we have required district courts to provide “an 
identification of relevant factual issues and an analysis of the law that justifies the ruling 
with respect to those issues.”  Forbes, 313 F.3d at 149.  Read together, Grant and Forbes 
require an identification of the factual issues pertinent to each official claiming qualified 
immunity and an analysis of the law as it applies to the determination of each official’s 
qualified immunity claim. 
 In considering the qualified immunity defense in this case, the District Court did 
not engage in the requisite analysis as to each official’s specific conduct in the context of 
the retaliation claims asserted by Griffin-El.  Instead, having already decided to deny 
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summary judgment on the merits of the claims, the District Court reiterated that Griffin-
El had alleged the violation of a constitutional right:  “Here, as explained, taking the facts 
in the light most favorable to plaintiff, at this stage of the proceedings plaintiff has 
provided sufficient evidence of a constitutional violation of his right to submit complaints 
and grievances without suffering retaliation.”  Griffin-El v. Beard, No. 06-2719, 2010 
WL 1837813, at *9 (E.D. Pa. April 30, 2010).  The District Court then determined that 
the right allegedly violated was clearly established:  “[I]t would be clear to a reasonable 
prison official at the relevant time in the specific context of this case that plaintiff had a 
right to be free from retaliation for exercising his right to file grievances.”  Id.  Finally, 
the District Court summarily concluded that triable issues of fact remained with respect 
to the underlying retaliation claims, which would bear on the entitlement to immunity:  
“To the extent that defendants argue that they had legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for 
their actions, ‘[their] argument is more properly viewed as a challenge to the factual 
issues of motivation and rebuttal.’”  Id. (quoting Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 
216, 232-33 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Monteiro v. City of Elizabeth, 436 F.3d 397, 404-05 
(3d Cir. 2006) (“whether [defendant’s] conduct violated clearly established law depended 
upon [defendant’s] motivation” for alleged retaliatory act)).  The District Court 
accordingly denied the motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity 
without stating whether there was sufficient evidence of motive as to each Appellant to 
justify submitting the issue to a jury. 
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 As indicated above, Forbes “announce[d] a supervisory rule to be followed in all 
subsequent cases in which a summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity is 
denied on the ground that material facts are subject to genuine dispute.”  313 F.3d at 146.  
The rule requires district courts “to specify those material facts that are and are not 
subject to genuine dispute and explain their materiality.”  Id.  We find that the District 
Court’s cursory reference to the “factual issues of motivation and rebuttal” fails to meet 
the specificity required by Forbes. 
 Griffin-El’s retaliation claims arose in different contexts, and different defendants 
interacted with Griffin-El in different ways and at different times.  For instance, 
Appellants Scarpati and Thomas are sued based solely on their search of Griffin-El’s cell 
and seizure of certain items, an event that occurred before any grievance was even filed 
by Griffin-El.  The District Court did not provide any analysis of the facts that are unique 
to the First Amendment retaliation claims asserted against Scarpati and Thomas.  
Appellant Pallott is sued based upon a vote that could have resulted in the revocation of 
Griffin-El’s single-cell status, but it is not clear that her vote had that effect.  Moreover, 
she disclaimed knowledge of any of the purported First Amendment protected activity 
that Griffin-El asserts was the motivating force for her vote.  The District Court did not 
address these matters in its opinion.  Other Appellants’ alleged retaliation springs from 
different conduct with respect to the alleged First Amendment protected activity.  The 
District Court’s reference to “issues of motivation and rebuttal” simply does not enable 
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us to engage in the requisite defendant-specific review of the District Court’s blanket 
denial of qualified immunity. 
 We will therefore vacate the District Court’s denial of summary judgment on the 
basis of qualified immunity and remand for the District Court to specify, in compliance 
with Forbes, which material facts, if any, preclude qualified immunity as to each 
Appellant.  On remand, the District Court should ensure it analyzes separately the 
specific conduct of each Appellant in determining whether Griffin-El has “adduced 
evidence sufficient for a factfinder to conclude that a reasonable public official would 
have known that his or her conduct had violated clearly established constitutional 
rights.”2
III. 
  Grant, 98 F.3d at 118. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate the portion of the order denying 
Appellants’ motion for summary judgment on Griffin-El’s First Amendment retaliation 
claims, and remand for the District Court to address the qualified immunity issue in 
accordance with this opinion. 
                                              
2 We are sensitive to the burden we impose on the able District Court where, as 
here, a plaintiff sues a host of individuals.  But each state actor is entitled to have the 
defense of qualified immunity considered in the context of his or her specific conduct in 
determining whether there is indeed a genuine dispute of fact material to the question of 
whether “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the 
situation he confronted.”  Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. 
